

R1 Post-CAS: End the Death Zone: Against the Inhumane Treatment of Asylum Seekers on the Belarusian Border

Proposer: Protests, Ostra Ziele?
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Human and migrant rights are under attack in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Belarus. The illegitimate former president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is using migrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East as hybrid war weapons against Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Europe as a whole.

The regime in Belarus explicitly attacks the Baltic States due to their support for the democratic opposition. This weaponization of human lives is another disgusting attack against human rights by the illegitimate Belarusian regime, which for years has attacked activists that are against Lukashenko's dictatorship.

Disturbingly, the response by the Latvian, Polish, and Lithuanian governments is just as inhumane as Lukashenko had planned and expected. The migrants are forced to stay in the border zone for months without shelter. There are many reports of violence against migrants by border guards on both sides. More people have died on the Polish-Belarusian border in less than two years than people trying to cross the border that used to split Germany during the Cold War.

Unfortunately, it is very hard to understand the situation fully, as governments are not letting activists and journalists reach the border zone due to the state of emergency. The Latvian government started an investigation against an NGO called *I Want to Help Refugees* for providing humanitarian help to the migrants stuck on the border. The Polish government first abused the legal possibilities by introducing a state of emergency on the border and then attacked independent organizations, media, and activists by creating strategic lawsuits against their participation and providing help, as well as using public media to spread their political propaganda about this situation. The Lithuanian border guard started an investigation against an NGO for assisting migrants on the border on assumption that this is a case of people smuggling. These all are clear breaches of democratic principles by these governments.

Right-wing and far-right parties have used this crisis to continue their anti-migrant policy and increase the dehumanization of migrants and refugees.

This is explicitly noticeable during the election period. Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are now building expensive border walls, which are causing huge environmental risks. The fear and increasing dehumanization have moved the focus away from the victims through this shameless power play to the exaggerated idea of safety risks.

Nothing – even the tallest and strongest wall – can stop a person who desperately seeks asylum or a better future. But the cruelty and breaking of all the rights performed by these governments clearly show us the consequences of cynical political play that ignores the importance of human life.

Activists and local societies are doing their best to help families find their loved ones that went missing on the border. They are their only hope. Replacing the government services and risking their own lives, they fight to restore dignity and an elementary sense of humanity and safety to migrants and refugees.

The Federation of Young European Greens calls for an immediate end to the inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees by the Belarusian regime and governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. FYEG stands in solidarity with all those affected by this crisis and will continue to work towards a world where the rights and dignity of all people, regardless of their background or status, are respected and protected.

We ask the European Union:

To put pressure on the Baltic states to respect the European Convention on Human Rights;

To stop criminalising solidarity actors and people on the move, and guarantee access to the border zone to solidarity actors to help with humanitarian aid;

To stop countries using state of emergency acts to violate Human Rights.

Reason

Post-CAS

R2 Younger institutions for a greener future

Proposer: Joves Ecosocialistes, Juventud Verde, Neoi
Prasinoi
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Current situation:

We, the younger generations, are the future of any democracy, as we are the future leaders that will bring new ideas to solve our world's problems. But it seems our ideas and proposals will only be relevant when we are not young anymore. The young population is underrepresented in our parliaments and in the decision-making processes. The reluctance to a generational change means the impossibility to bring new ideas, new policies, and new ways of doing policies, which carries great threats for democracies, and for the greatest challenge of our time: the climate crisis. Thus, while youth stays out of the table when it comes to decision-making, it is the older generations of decision-makers, the ones who overlook science, mock activists and prioritise private profit over people, the ones who will deal with the consequences of inaction.

Being climate change the most pressing and intersectional crises of all times, future generations should be protected from the worst-case scenario, but the current situation shows that our claims are not being listened to, in some sort of paradoxical logic, they are regarded as radical and naive at the same time. What's more, climate activists and our reasoning are also disregarded due to the ageist nature of our system: our experiences, concerns and proposals are ignored because we are young.

According to [Eurostat](#), the percentage of young people (15-29 years old) in the European Union (EU) in 2021 was 16,3%. And in 2023 the majority of Member States of the EU count with 0-9% of representatives who were 30 or younger. Therefore, we can see youth is underrepresented in national parliaments. The European Parliament does not stay out of this trend: while around 20% of the Europeans are between 18 and 35 years of age, roughly 10% of the MEPs are younger than 35. This constitutes a stark underrepresentation of the young (Stockemer & Sundström).

Percentage of MPs 30 years of age or younger in 2023 in national parliaments:

https://data.ipu.org/compare?field=chamber%3A%3Atotal_younger_30_percentage®ion=europe&structure=any_lower_chamber#map

In accordance with the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is a need to prevent and counter all forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on age. For the correct functioning of a democracy, there is a need for the participation in politics of all social groups, so that decisions made are legitimate. But the functioning of political parties and our political systems leave out young candidates, with a corresponding effect of decreasing youth engagement in politics because of a lack of ownership of the decisions and the ways in which decisions are taken.

The increase of representativeness of the younger population in parliaments also helps closing the gender gap. According to the [Inter-Parliamentary Union](#), there are more women parliamentarians in younger age groups. The older the members of parliament, the fewer women MPs in the chambers. For example, within the 21-30 age group, the male to female ratio among MPs is approximately 60:40. For the 31-40 age group, the ratio decreases to approximately 2:1.

Acknowledging the state of the situation, and in the scope of the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2024, as young greens we call on taking action to increase the number of young representatives in candidate lists to the EP, so that the overall percentage of young MEPs increases.

We believe that mother parties of young wings do not make enough room for young candidates by not putting them in electable positions. So, we call on them to reflect on their progressiveness when they do not take into consideration younger and future generations' needs.

For all that, the Federations of Young European Greens **calls**:

- On the European Green Party to take one step further on young candidates, expanding and updating on the spirit of the resolution "[Renewing and Rejuvenating the Greens](#)" approved in 2017, with clear objectives to have an impact in the national candidacies of its member Parties in elections at all levels, and especially towards the EU elections 2024.
- On the European Union to create a directive for vote at 16 at least in the European elections.
- On the European states, its governments and decision makers, to work to increase the number of young people in legislative and representative chambers at all levels, and change their electoral laws to include the

right to vote at 16.

- On stakeholders, political, social and cultural leaders contribute to put an end to the stigmatisation and invisibilisation of young people, our demands and our experiences.
- Parties need to have a percentage of young and diverse candidates (15-20%)
- FYEG can push green parties to have this mandatory percentage so they are really progressive.
 - We are the future, let us take part/ co-create to work on creating the future we want.

References:

Stockemer, D., Sundström, A. Young deputies in the European Parliament: a starkly underrepresented age group. *Acta Polit* 54, 124–144 (2019).
<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-018-0078-0>

Reason

To help the voices of the youth heard by increasing our representation in the democratic institutions.

R3 Weeding out right-wing extremism

Proposer: Jong Groen
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions
Status: Withdrawn

Motion text

Violent extremism and terrorism pose a threat to the safety of all Europeans and the fabric of our societies. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, the UN and EU created lists of persons and groups associated with terrorist acts, who would then be targeted with restrictive measures to limit their ability to inflict harm. The EU expanded upon this in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP 931) which defines terrorist acts and the measures that can be taken against them. In 2016, after various attacks instigated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Daesh), the EU expanded its sanctioning capacities for persons connected to Al-Qaida or Daesh. Now the EU could sanction persons and groups without requiring a prior listing by the UN or an EU member state. The current strategy appears to be relatively successful in combating terrorism and extremist violence motivated by Islamism. Sadly, every time the EU has acted after the fact, in 2001 as well as in 2016, even though the broader threat had been there for a longer time.

While Islamist violence remains the largest terrorist threat in Europe, right-wing violent extremism and terrorism is growing rapidly. Right-wing extremist violence stems from a reactionary ideology that blames social minorities and progressive politics for societal problems. The prevalence of hate against specific groups inevitably leads to violence being committed against them. The increase of right-wing violence in North-America, Oceania and Europe is a result of online hate speech and the mainstreaming of reactionary politics. Beyond violence directed at specific minorities, reactionaries also direct violence against basic democratic principles such as freedom of speech, fair elections and a free press. As global as the threat may be, countries are often left to their own devices to combat right-wing violent extremism. The national focus of right-wing extremists, belies their ability to form strong transnational bonds. Within Europe there exist financial and strategic linkages between similar right-wing extremist groups that enable them to further spread their message, radicalize new recruits and orchestrate deadly terrorist attacks. Therefore even a supposed lone actor still relies on a broad network spreading propaganda and encouraging violent action.

The terrorist attacks of Christchurch spurred an international reaction to combat and remove violent extremist and terrorist content from online fora. While these efforts were fruitful in removing the most heinous of content, internet companies still do far too little to combat harmful content on their platform. European states should further instrumentalize their collective leverage to diminish the radicalization potential of online media. These online platforms also provide an avenue for outside influencing, like Russian hybrid warfare, and the spread of violent conspiracy theories, like Q-Anon.

As of now the EU has not listed a single person, group or entity of a right-wing signature based on CP 931. There has not been a Union-wide effort to combat and prevent violent right-wing extremism through restrictive measures such as freezing assets. A broad approach, including close cooperation between law enforcement in various European countries is necessary to combat this threat. In order to effectively combat online radicalization, popular internet platforms should closely moderate their platforms to avoid hate speech turning into violence.

Concretely we:

- Urge the EU to list violent right-wing extremist persons, groups and entities on the basis of CP 931, allowing the EU to freeze assets and limit travel by the listed extremists. Another possible course of action is targeting these right-wing extremists for money laundering.
- Advise to disrupt right-wing recruitment on online platforms, a strategy that was successfully implemented for Daesh and other Islamist extremist groups.
- Encourage a broader information exchange and investigative cooperation between European law enforcement.

R4 A Harvest of Change: A Resolution to Reap Fairness in Agricultural Lobbying

Proposer: DWARS, GroenLinkse Jongeren
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

A Harvest of Change: A Resolution to Reap Fairness in Agricultural Lobbying

Introduction

Based on last year's resolution on agroecological transition ([here](#)), we aim to identify key accelerators to foster dearly necessary transitions in the European agricultural sector. It has long been proven that these transitions are necessary. However, most unfortunately, political actors are failing to react appropriately. Due to this, alternative solutions that challenge the status quo are still considered niche innovations, while the incumbent regime of socio-ecologically harmful practices remains the undefeated norm. As established in FYEG Resolution 2022 'Towards an agroecological Europe by 2030', the current agricultural system does not only cause tremendous environmental harm, inter alia via soil pollution and erosion, depleted and polluted waters and desertification, but also ultimately the degradation of whole landscapes. This is not only a major issue for the people whose livelihood depends on the fertility of the land, but also the loss of precious resources that future generations will have to rely on. Thus, FYEG calls for fundamental reforms in agricultural policies and the re-prioritisation of policy goals.

A vast body of research suggests one or several socio-technical transitions in the agricultural sector to be imperative in order to achieve desired social and sustainability goals (references [here](#)). Socio-technical transitions are a completely normal, constantly ongoing process that simply ensures sectors to renew themselves, fitting to changing times; the agricultural transition, however, seems to experience a lock-in effect (references [here](#)).

Lock-in effect

Taking a closer look at an example that demonstrates this lock-in effect. In May 2020, Euro Commissioner Frans Timmermans presented the 'Farm to Fork Strategies' as an important component of the European Green Deal. In the name of aiming for a more healthy, fair, sustainable and environmentally appropriate food system, the European Commission set up goals to ensure the recovery and perseverance of biodiversity, such as a reduction of 50% of pesticides used within Europe by the year of 2030 (reference [here](#)). Pesticides manufacturers, most of which are multinationals with sales volumes of over 2 billion Euros each (reference [here](#)), responded to these proposed measures by stating this goal was not realistically attainable to them, and pleading for more research (reference [here](#)). Sabotage, says Nina Holland, a researcher of the agriculture lobby. She explains how agriculture lobby groups try to convince the public of their good will regarding the goals proposed by the Green European Deal, whilst simultaneously doing everything in their power to try and delay the measurements that have to be taken in order to accomplish these goals. Lobby groups sow doubt by stating a lack of scientific proof, as well as sowing fear by claiming that Farm to Fork poses a risk to food security (reference [here](#)).

The lock-in effect becomes visible when looking at the ways these lobby strategies have forestalled the social-technological transition, both in the past and now. When in 1962 scientist Rachel Carson warned of the damaging effects of pesticides, the industry responded with threats of a shortage in food supply - quite interestingly, similarly to recent examples (reference [here](#)). In 2009, the EU implemented a framework directive on Sustainable Use of Pesticides (SUD), however, member states and other institutions have not managed to successfully implement the SUD directive (reference [here](#))

To ensure better implementation of SUD, it is being revised and adjusted, so that, in this revised framework directive, the Farm to Fork reduction target is incorporated (reference [here](#)). However, mostly on the level of member states, the Farm to Fork reduction target faces a lot of backlash, to say the least. Agricultural lobby promotes a narrative where it is said we 'have to look at science first'. A slogan that is reinforced by paid research and skewed media coverage that focuses on the pretended negative economic consequences of the Farm to Fork Strategies (reference [here](#)). Conservative and populist parties point to these lobby-funded articles and studies and declare bad timing; in the recent past with regards to Covid-19, today in regards to the war in Ukraine (references used [here](#)). In sum; for decades, the same arguments have been preventing the agriculture sector from moving forward.

Policy feedback

This lock-in effect is amplified by policy feedback. Reinforcing policy feedbacks are created when, e.g., policy favours a specific interest group, which will then work towards expanding that policy or policy creates

interlinkages between agencies and political leaders (reference [here](#)). Hence, so called, stable states are created in which incumbent (i.e. dominant, occupant) regimes can make use of reinforcing feedbacks by generating more political support for their incumbent position; which makes change even more challenging.

This is what we see in agricultural policy making. The agriculture sector makes up for almost 40% of the EU budget; between 2014 and 2020, the EU invested over 400 billion dollars in the industry (reference used [here](#)). It is then not surprising that the sectors' lobby is huge compared to the lobby of other stakeholders. It has been reported that in 2020 and 2021, the prime actors in the agriculture business spent over 50 million euros on lobby activities, although these reported numbers usually turn out to be much higher in reality (reference [here](#)). Environmental and civil society organisations are unable to compete with those kinds of numbers. But this also counts for small-scale farmers, who definitely do not always feel rightfully represented by big lobby organisations. Many independent farmers express a positive attitude towards the price increases that would arise from incorporating the environmental cost of agriculture and focussing on fair trade practices. (reference [here](#)). On top of this, it is known that 80% of the EU agricultural funding ends up at only 20% of the biggest farms within the European Union (reference [here](#)). A research by Lighthouse Reports, Dw, Follow the Money, Mediapart and Domani, paints the following picture:

“What emerges is a portrait of wealthy industrial pressure groups – from petrochemical companies and multinational meat-packing giants to pharmaceutical businesses – that have a stubborn hold over EU policy as well as critical differences with the family farmers whose welfare they say they aim to defend.”
- reference [here](#)

Deliberate acceleration of sustainable alternatives by policymakers or powerful actors is required in order to enable diffusion and movement within the system (reference [here](#)). In order to increase the likelihood of bringing about change in such a set up, it is found that two developments should intersect. Namely, (1) bottom-up development and mobilisation for alternative solutions that challenge the stable state, needs to be paired up with the (2) weakening of factors that are reinforcing the stable state (reference [here](#) and [here](#)).

While bottom up action has been building up for decades (reference [here](#)), the stable state seems to be so locked-in, that deliberate weakening of the incumbent regime is required in order to enable fair conditions for necessary change to be possible.

Conclusion

The EU is setting out ambitious sustainability goals, such as described in the

European Green Deal, in which the 'Farm to fork' strategy is integrated (reference [here](#)). One of the goals of this policy is the reduction of the use of pesticides by 50% in 2030 (reference used [here](#)). However, due to the lock-in effect, the anticipated changes are slowed down. Agricultural lobbyists sow doubt about the effects of the transition, based on lobby-funded research. Wherever possible, these lobbyists try to stall the reforms. The same arguments (for example that the topic hasn't been researched enough) have been used for decades.

Then there is also the policy feedback-system. Reinforcing policy feedback happens when policy makers prefer a particular interest group. Environmental and civil organisations are not able to compete with these kinds of sums. This strengthens the policy feedback of the dominant agricultural stakeholders.

These kinds of imbalanced proportions are unacceptable. But how can we change these systems? While public action and technologies are being mobilised and developed, the first factor needs to be tackled by politics and policies. The aim of our propositions is to deconstruct the imbalanced lobbyism power in the agricultural sector. Therefore, we, the Federation of Young European Greens, call upon the European Union and its Member States to:

- End privileged access to the fossil industry. In some formats lobbyists have repeatedly been granted privileged access to politics, which other actors did not enjoy in the same form. Advisory bodies and institutionalised exchange rounds in the context of the energy transition and the regulation of the agricultural industry must not be one-sided, either in terms of personnel or topics. Interest groups such as environmental and consumer protection associations, must be adequately represented and must not be given a fig leaf function.
- Ensure balanced and broad participation by establishing balanced contacts and integration of interests. Stakeholders with concerns in the areas of climate, environmental and consumer protection, social affairs and human rights are often not listened to by political decision-makers on energy policy issues to the same extent as the large energy companies and their associations. Relevant actors who do not have the necessary financial resources and privileged access, but who nevertheless contribute important social concerns and expertise, must therefore be proactively involved by policymakers. Innovative formats such as citizens' councils or regional transformation councils could be good starting points for broad participation and have already proven their worth in many places.
- Research the establishment of a budgetary limit for the agriculture lobby

in order to regulate their spending on lobby activities. The financial means of the agriculture lobby are wildly out of proportion compared to other stakeholders as named above, so that equal representation of interests is seriously disturbed. A budgetary limit on lobby activities could possibly create a more balanced playing field, so that other stakeholders can have an equal say and their interests are taken into account.

- Tighten existing rules on lateral moves from politics to business and, in particular, to lobby jobs. Time and again, politicians turn the knowledge they have acquired in a democratic office or mandate into money by switching to lobby jobs. This promotes existing power imbalances, since only a few actors can afford highly paid former top politicians. In addition, there is a danger that politicians will look for lucrative lobbying jobs while they are still in office and base their political decisions on them. That is why clear rules are needed for blocking periods and waiting periods. The existing waiting period is too short, and it is still possible to change sides very soon after leaving politics. The waiting period for government members must be significantly extended and changes in lobbying activities must be ruled out. There also needs to be more effective monitoring options. Plans for the European Parliament to prohibit Members of Parliament from taking up paid lobbying activities after leaving Parliament for a limited period of time are positive. In addition, former Members of Parliament should lose their access privileges, which have been valid for life until now, and they should be allowed to work as lobbyists after the expiry of the time limit.

R5 Speak Up, Speak Out: Protecting the Right to Protest

Proposer: DWARS, GroenLinkse Jongeren
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Speak Up, Speak Out: Protecting the Right to Protest

More and more people are joining in climate activism, voicing their concerns on the streets of Europe and beyond. While these protests are peaceful, police forces are used as if the protesters were violent (eg. the violent repercussions against students in Turin's Piazza Arbarello student protest in 2022, or the recent blockades of the A12 motorway in The Hague - reference [here](#)). Increasing militarisation is happening in many ways, including the deployment of armed military forces to suppress protests and supplying police with equipment like armoured vehicles, military-grade aircraft, surveillance drones, guns and assault weapons, stun grenades and sound cannons. Military forces are organised, trained and equipped for war and defence and have no place at a protest, where police should be trained in de-escalation, mediation and keeping people safe. Governments try to justify this disproportionate escalation in the use of force by painting protesters as a threat to public safety, but in truth, these tactics are ultimately a way to intimidate people into silence. Police and other state authorities often use facial recognition software and CCTV and IMSI tracking technologies to track phones. The use of mass surveillance tactics like this not only invades protesters' right to privacy but also intimidates people so that they are less likely to want to attend protests in the first place.

We argue that "everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests [,]" as stated by the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association - reference [here](#)). "No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" (reference [here](#)).

Having considered the facts laid out in this resolution, we, the Federation of Young European Greens calls upon the European Union and its Member States to:

- 31 • Implement stricter regulation of the escalation of the use of violence
32 when intervening, and list robust repercussions when the escalation
33 exceeds legislative standards.

- 34 • Create a public system of proportionate policing which utilises the
35 classification of the types of protests and a democratic decision on what
36 is needed to keep protests within legal and civil bounds, to ensure
37 safety.

- 38 • Improve the training of police forces to limit the number of unnecessarily
39 violent interventions of protest and ensure the authorities are trained to
40 use the least intrusive means and respond in proportion to the offence
41 (reference [here](#)).

- 42 • Campaign for a ban on the production and distribution of abusive tools of
43 torture, such as contact electric shock devices and spiked batons. These
44 tools serve only the purpose of inflicting pain. Usage of these tools,
45 especially in the setting of peaceful protests, is harmful and even
46 unlawful under the UN Convention against Torture (reference [here](#)).

- 47 • Alter national considerations of public demonstrations as a threat to
48 public order or national security. Shift focus of police presence from
49 intimidating and controlling protesters to prioritising the protection of
50 protesters.

- 51 • Campaign for stricter regulations on the distribution and use of weaponry
52 by authorities, following the limits already imposed by the European
53 Convention on Human Rights, and ensure the articles of the latter are
54 strictly maintained during demonstrations (reference [here](#)). In the
55 instances in which police officers may be required to use force, eg.
56 during the arrest of a violent person or to protect themselves or others,
57 it is crucial that any use of force is limited to the minimum. It should
58 also be applied lawfully and be accounted for by, for example, monitoring
59 safe policing through agents' bodycams (Ibid.).

- 60 • Ban arbitral detention and sentencing of demonstrators, such as, but not
61 limited to, in instances where elements of disruption (eg. blocking
62 traffic or noise) are criminalised and stigmatised as serious offences, or
63 even used as accusations of "terrorism" (in 2017, the UK government

64 imposed charges based on counterterrorism legislation against protestors
65 that had blocked Stansted Airport during a non-violent act of
66 disobedience) (reference [here](#)).

R6 Concrete social policies for a real social and fair Europe

Proposer: Les Jeunes Ecologistes, Joves
Ecosocialistes, écolo j
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Concrete social policies for a real social and fair Europe

Context : The Europe of the economy is falling apart

Since 1950 and the CECA, the European construction was made through reinforcing economic cooperation and the market. However, this has shown its limits.

Indeed, there has been a clear increase in inequality in Europe since the 1980s, with an alarming rise in poverty rates. It is in this more general context of inflation, of difficulty for Europeans to have access to essential goods, aggravating these heavy trends, and when the far right is trying to stripe of the social progress made so far, that Europe must implement social mechanisms and must adopt directives that improve our living conditions in a very concrete way.

What is at stake : the need to build a more social Europe

All of this makes us believe that there is a crucial need to build a concrete European project, in which people can believe in, which addresses planetary and social crises. We must strongly defend a justice project: tax justice (See title 4, subtitled "Fiscal Policy" of the political platform) that gives us the means to achieve social and environmental justice.

A more social Europe to build a concrete Europe for its citizens...

We urgently need concrete mechanisms to create a feeling of belonging to the EU. People must be aware that what is decided at European level impacts on them daily. They must understand that the impacts can be particularly positive if they mobilise themselves with us for a real project for a Social Europe that

breaks away from the neo-liberal vision that has been the norm until now. One example is the Social Imbalance Procedure (SIP), a mechanism to enhance social rights in the EU and assess EU members social policies.

... includes a transformation of its institutions...

It is therefore a project for the transformation of the EU, a concrete project, clear, legible in the measures we must propose. A project that contrasts with the commonly shared vision of a technocratic Europe that does not care about the general interest and the interests of all EU citizens. In this way, it is crucial to extend and deepen the social pillar of the EU.

This project of a concrete social and federal Europe is the only serious project able to receive the assent of a majority of Europeans, particularly those from the working and middle classes who today abstain from voting or oppose the current European project.

We must strongly advocate for a Europe of reduced inequality: a Europe where all citizens are winners. We also defend a Europe which prioritises action towards planetary crisis, since the increasing pollution, climate change, and biodiversity loss, among other issues, are affecting ecosystems and human health. The COVID-19 pandemic is a clear example of disease of the anthropocene. The right to the protection of human health is included in the EU Social Charter as a main principle, and needs to be boarded up. Indeed, the green Europe we want to build needs to be just and pursue across-cutting equity, making sure that existing inequalities, as well as structural obstacles for marginalised groups are being diminished.

Moreover, in this context of inflation, and in particular of energy price inflation, which impacts the whole supply chain, which therefore strongly affects the purchasing power of citizens, we, as Greens, must strongly defend the access to carbon neutral energy as a right, and we must be in this way, a force of proposal for reforming the European energy market. We can only note the major failure of energy liberalisation. Competition has not led to lower prices, quite the opposite. We urgently need to revise European energy policy. We need to act structurally to better control energy prices to guarantee fair and affordable prices, in quantities compatible with the necessary sobriety of a carbon neutral society, to every European citizen, public organisation, and company.

Implementation: involve every level of governance and multi-stakeholders in constructing a social Europe

We call upon the European Parliament, the Member States and the European

Commission to:

- Set up a European legislation for a European minimum income from the age of 18 years old : For it to be pertinent, this minimum income needs to be at least equal to the poverty line of the country. This income has to be indexed to inflation.
- We call on the European Union to put in place the most coercive mechanism possible to ensure that Member States implement correctly the Minimum Wage Directive (EU) 2022/2041
- Extend and deepen the already existing social pillar through the regions of the EU by funding them at a satisfactory level, focusing on education, health, housing, employment, social security and migration. It is an important way to build a federal Europe and to make the UE more tangible for EU citizens and to ensure the EU Green deal enhances a green transition that is just and leaves none behind (following what it is stated in the "[Green Principles for a Just Transition](#)"). We therefore call to increase ERDF resources and increase the percentage allocated to social, job creation and local development components. We also call to increase the resources of the European Social Fund (ESF+).

We call upon the FYEG's executive board to :

- Be proactive on social issues during the building of the campaign with partner organisations, and on the fact that having a solid discourse for a real social and federal Europe is the only way that the Europe we all want can finally come into reality.

We propose the FYEG's executive board to :

- Implement a back-to-school campaign for a European minimum income from the age of 18. It may be a significant marker to launch the dynamic for the European campaign and to increase the capacity and number of members of our Member Organisations thanks to a campaign that is appealing to young people because it is significant for their quality of life.

We suggest Member organisations of the FYEG :

- 91 • To implement FYEG's Campaign for a social Europe in their local context.
- 92 • Spread the voices of young ecologists sharing their stories on social and
93 economic rights.
- 94 • To advocate towards their local, regional and national governments to
95 implement and enhance the exposure of EU wide social projects.

R7 Touristification: their holidays, our misery.

Proposer: Joves Ecosocialistes and Neoi Prasinoi
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

1 The current economic system puts profit before people, everything and anything
2 on this earth can be commercialised beyond its limits, from labour to natural
3 resources, with gain and economic growth as a pretext. Our cities and
4 communities are being transformed due to aggressive and unsustainable tourism.
5 Our home towns and cities are crowded, the public transportation is often
6 designed to accommodate the demands of seasonal visitors instead of the needs of
7 the local community and traditional local long-life businesses are being
8 replaced by 24h supermarkets or souvenirs shops. These are some of the
9 consequences of touristification, a process by which a place changes as it
10 becomes an object of tourist consumption. This process affects both rural and
11 urban areas with the same principle and carrying very similar repercussions: the
12 locals are expelled from their neighbourhoods as the tourism industry damages
13 the labour market and the environment. Touristification affects particularly the
14 mediterranean countries, where low-cost flights and the rise of peer-to-peer
15 online platforms are thriving on the lack of courage of decision-makers, but the
16 main European cities and some rural areas are no strangers to this phenomenon.

17 Touristification turns local cultures to commodities, driving a loss of
18 traditional livelihoods, and creating tourism enclaves within our cities which
19 are completely disconnected from local communities. The economy of many Southern
20 European cities relies on mass tourism, a sector which is characterized by
21 having precarious jobs with low wages and suffering from seasonality. Overmore,
22 it has a negative effect on the housing sector, increasing the prices of rent
23 for the neighbours of the city, who are generally poorer than most of the
24 tourists. People who work in the touristic sector, many of them young, report
25 cramped living conditions and barely earning a living wage.

26 Touristification also has a negative impact on the environment, increasing the
27 levels of pollution and damaging local ecosystems. Mass tourism generates a huge
28 amount of waste and water and energy consumption over the replacement rate,
29 which is critical in the planetary crises we are facing. Ecosystems in the South
30 of Europe are one of the most vulnerable to climate change. Besides that, the
31 lack of control of the number of seasonal visitors puts at risk both the locals
32 and the tourists in case of an eventual emergency, whether natural or

33 industrial, as the evacuation and emergency plans are often not designed taking
34 into account the enormous amount of tourists in the area.

35 Touristification is shaping the urban landscape, where tourists and their needs
36 are prioritized above local people's necessities. For instance, public space and
37 public transport networks are saturated with tourists. Moreover, gentrification
38 is another consequence of the touristification, since long-term residents and
39 businesses are displaced due to the increasing property value led by
40 implementation of touristic accommodations (hotels, apartments, Airbnbs...). In
41 fact, the social, economic and environmental changes caused by this model of
42 tourism have also had a negative effect on our health. Touristification
43 intersects with other social injustices, such as racism, sexism, and ableism,
44 and certain groups may be excluded from tourism opportunities or may face
45 discrimination in tourism settings.

46 A special reference needs to be made to the rupture of social bonds provoked by
47 the touristically-induced gentrification. In the case of the short-term rentals,
48 as a result of the high popularity of such digital platforms, the traditional
49 neighborly relations have been disrupted. The constant replacement of renters,
50 who do not give the impression of becoming integrated in the local culture,
51 provoke the suspicion of the rest of the inhabitants and even fear by the
52 elderly as the latter ones feel they lack stability. Therefore, many values of
53 the once-established notion of the «community» have been lost

54 Mass tourism practices such as the all-inclusive packages also have strong
55 negative impacts in local economies and societies. This type of vacation -
56 offered by big companies such as Thomas Cook or Tuir- includes all of the
57 expenses associated with a holiday, from the flight to accommodation, meals and
58 activities. However, they do not benefit local economies. The type of work that
59 this model of business creates, often for young people, women and migrants, is
60 an archetype of precariousness. One of the groups affected the most by this
61 model is the hotel housekeepers. During the past years, these workers, who are
62 mostly women from migrant and working backgrounds, reported that they are forced
63 to work at an inhumane pace. They are overworked with horrible consequences for
64 their health: muscular pain due to the repetition of movements, irritation of
65 the respiratory tracts due to the exposure to chemical products, and
66 neurological and mental health problems caused by the stress and anxiety as they
67 worry they can be fired in case they are not able to deliver.

68 Overall, touristification and mass tourism are potential generators of social
69 inequalities, and imply growth models that promote social injustice through the
70 exploitation of people and nature. Decision-makers have the power to take
71 control of this situation by tackling the main consequences in the market like
72 the rising price of housing, by limiting the number of visitors and pushing for
73 a change of model, and also by ensuring that the workers of this sector are
74

treated in line with labour rights and human dignity.

For all that, the Federation of Young European Greens calls on:

- Local, regional and national governments to design and implement policies that promote a different model of tourism, based on sustainability and the well-being of the local communities, while mitigating the negative impacts of touristification that we are already experiencing.

- Local governments to cap on licenses for tourist apartments, hotels and resorts in tensioned areas, due to ecological and social reasons, and include tourist taxations and limiting the number of tourists to mitigate the effects of this sector.

- To apply strict labour controls in the tourism sector to avoid job insecurity, which is not allowing youth to live decent lives.

- The European Union to enforce legally binding environmental protection from tourism, and include the destruction of our natural areas (forests, coastal areas, water bodies) due to tourism in the list of environmental crimes.

- To make sure affordable housing options are available for people in touristified areas, implementing rent control and implementing inclusionary zoning method, that is to determine which neighborhoods are compatible with short-term rentals for tourists so as to limit the consequences of this phenomenon's overspreading and gentrification.

- The European Union and state members' to stop subsidizing massive tourism activities and fossil-fuel activities and prioritizing alternative modes of travel, like cycling or public transportation.

- To promote other less-known sustainable areas which have the capacity to withstand the impact of tourism and thus to redirect the crowds of visitors whose stereotypic holiday choices contribute to the degradation of classic destinations.

- To promote the diversification of Southern economies, to make them more resilient to planetary crisis, such as the climate emergency or the war in Ukraine.

R8 Addressing the Structural Issues Underlying the Tide of Disinformation

Proposer: Young Greens of England and Wales,
Scottish Young Greens, Neoi Prasinoi,
Forum Mladih URA

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

What is Disinformation?

Disinformation is false or misleading information spread intentionally in order to advance political or ideological goals, make profit, or create harm. It is different to misinformation, which is false information shared unintentionally. This resolution focusses on disinformation as it entails a motive to deceive, therefore perpetrators are more culpable for its consequences. Further, tackling disinformation reduces opportunities for misinformation to spread.

Why Should It Be Reduced?

Damage to Democracy

Disinformation undermines the democratic process by undermining access to truthful and reliable information. For example, the outcome of the UK's 2016 referendum on EU membership is thought to have been influenced by false and misleading information spread intentionally through traditional and social media.

Undermining Trust

Disinformation both propagates general societal distrust and thrives when social distrust is high, creating a vicious circle. This was illustrated during the COVID-19 pandemic, when disinformation about the virus led to distrust in health messaging from governments and health organisations, reducing vaccine uptake and health protective behaviour.

Impact on Marginalised Groups

Disinformation frequently entails the repetition of prejudiced and hateful narratives and tropes designed to reinforce existing power hierarchies that propagate racism, misogyny, xenophobia and transphobia. Further, marginalisation leads to institutional distrust which increases vulnerability to disinformation. For example, a disproportionate number of COVID-19 deaths among minority ethnic groups throughout Europe was compounded by the proliferation of disinformation in these communities' media ecosystems.

Warfare

Disinformation forms part of information warfare: the use, control and manipulation of information to advance a belligerents' goals in a military conflict. For example, false narratives about the war were actively spread by Russian state-controlled media and social media as part of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Environmental Impact

Disinformation has deeply worrying implications for the vital transition away from fossil fuel dependency and unsustainable growth capitalism. Evidence shows that oil and gas companies have long been aware of the risks their industry poses to the climate, yet they have spread false information to instil doubt about it, enabling them to continue business as usual.

For the health of our societies, our communities and our planet, it is essential that we act to reduce, regulate and build resilience to disinformation. Our calls are broken into three areas of action: traditional media, social media and resilient societies.

1. Traditional Media

Limited ownership and control of traditional media creates the motive and opportunity for a powerful minority to spread disinformation to consolidate their power and grow their profit. To reduce disinformation, it is vital that traditional media ownership is diverse and independent, and that free speech and high quality journalism that holds power to account is not only preserved, but incentivised.

FYEG calls for:

- Recognition that media organisations are part of the infrastructure of democracy and should be run for the benefit of society, not for limited private and personal gain

- Legislation to dismantle and prevent media monopolies (for example, antitrust laws), so the power to create information and knowledge is not held by a powerful minority
- Greater protection and facilitation of high quality independent journalism
- The formation of independent oversight bodies (or something similar to suit the political and media ecosystems of different countries), separate from both the state and private interests, to monitor, call out and address disinformation
- The EU to stand by its commitment to free press, prioritising it as a central requirement to EU membership for both existing and candidate members

2. Social Media

The advent of social media and algorithmically-driven news feeds have provided new and powerful ways of disseminating disinformation, in a targeted fashion, to enormous audiences, at once-inconceivable speeds. As a consequence, disinformation has overwhelmed and infiltrated our lives, sowing distrust, undermining democracy and threatening the health of our planet.

FYEG calls for:

- Action to restrict social media companies' use of algorithms that prioritise engagement over content veracity and quality
- Recognition of the damage caused and dangers posed to democracy by analytics services that run social media disinformation campaigns for clients
- Collaboration with social media companies and governments to end social media disinformation campaigns, both by analytics companies and state actors
- Recognition of the potential for disinformation posed by developments in

large language model artificial intelligence, and advocate for the pace of progress in this field to be consistent with safeguarding the ethical implications inherent within it

3. Fostering a society with greater resilience to disinformation

Increased uncertainty, such as housing insecurity, the cost of living crisis and the climate emergency, and decreased trust in institutions, fostered by structural oppression and negligent governance, makes people more susceptible to the easy answers provided by disinformation. Tackling disinformation is a social issue; disinformation-resilient societies require trust to be restored in the social contract.

FYEG calls for:

- Recognition that resilience to disinformation is a social issue, it is not the responsibility of individuals alone to inoculate themselves against disinformation
- Efforts to be taken to reduce uncertainty and insecurity in citizen's lives to be part of disinformation interventions
- Efforts to be taken to build and maintain a genuine basis for trust between individuals and the social institutions that govern and influence their lives to be part of disinformation interventions
- Recognition that marginalised groups are both more often the targets of disinformation and more vulnerable to the effects of disinformation, and for addressing marginalisation and seeking the active participation of marginalised groups to be part of any disinformation interventions
- The development of media literacy education to increase understanding of what disinformation is, how it is spread, how to spot it, and how to talk about it with others, with a particular focus on social media

R9 Position yourself on digital rights!

Proposer: écolo j, DWARS
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

1 Technology now permeates every aspect of our lives; the 'digital' angle has
2 become relevant to all domains - whether health¹, security², democracy³,
3 migration⁴, justice⁵, gender and personal identity⁶, international relations⁷,
4 or of course personal communications⁸. Digital rights are therefore increasingly
5 important, as they shape what is possible and what is necessary, the structure &
6 dynamics of our lives.

7 There is also an increasing interest from the general public into the digital -
8 the youth knows of the GAFAM, of the importance of personal data (GDPR), of the
9 way they are tracked on the internet in order to be targeted with intrusive
10 tailored ads, ...

11 However, green (and other) political parties have not yet picked up digital
12 rights as a key priority, despite it having become a core aspect of our lives
13 and of many 'green' fights. It is not clear for the public - and the youth
14 particularly - what a 'proper digital society' is for the different parties
15 within their framework of values (or at least that is not made clear enough to
16 the general public). Yet, it is both strategic and logical for greens across
17 Europe to claim the (currently rather unoccupied) spot of defenders of digital
18 rights, as it is in the continuity of the greens' values and the fights they
19 picked so far - ambitious and forward-looking.

20 It is particularly strategic as there are many recent and forthcoming laws that
21 are relevant from a digital rights perspective both at national level (e.g. in
22 Belgium: [data retention](#)) and at EU level (Digital Services Act, Data Act,
23 Artificial Intelligence Act, Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, Advance Passenger
24 Information Regulation, the European Health Data Space, etc.). More will come,
25 and hence the importance of the theme 'digital' is here to stay. Many rights &
26 interests are at stake with these laws - among others our rights to anonymity in
27 the public space, to freedom of speech, to freedom of information, to privacy,
28 to the secrecy of our personal communications, to freedom of movement, to
29 fairness & non-discrimination. Algorithms, on the other side, raise concerns
30 about key principles for individual and communal life - such as the principles
31

of transparency, accountability, fairness & non-discrimination, freedom of movement & speech.

These are rights that we fought hard to gain “back in the days”, and principles we fought to establish durably, but because they are ‘reborn’ under the prism of digital spaces and technologies, and because data, digital tools and processing power allow for unprecedented insights and ways to monitor and control people, these rights have to be fought for anew. Green parties already support and defend them, but ‘digital’ still remains a marginal topic politically - there is little political positioning through it despite its importance.

In light of the importance of these rights and principles, and in light of their newly-found prevalence in all areas of work traditionally (though not exclusively) ‘Green’, this motion is calling on Green parties to pick up digital rights as a key priority for the 2024 european elections - to think ahead together: what is a sustainable digital society? What principles & interests should prevail? What is our ambitious Green vision for a digital society (beyond the more ‘traditional’ green digital angles of sustainability, right to repair & digital divide), and how much of prominence should it have in a political program ?

This resolution is a call from the Federation of Young European Greens to seize the transversal topic of ‘digital’ in politics, a call to Green parties to position themselves (more clearly) as champions of a sustainable digitised society, and a call to claim the spotlight for an electorate who increasingly cares about the architecture of their digital personal, communal and political life. At a time where [tech has become the biggest lobby sector](#) in the EU by spending (ahead of pharma, fossil fuels, finance, and chemicals), let’s think ahead about what the key digital priorities of the green youth for the short- and long-term represent, and their place in politics!

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R10 No one sacrificed for European economy

Proposer: écolo j, Giovani Europeisti Verdi
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

A brief description of the dynamic

A capitalist system needs sacrifices to be successful.

Around Europe, in many industrial cities human lives are daily sacrificed for the "greater wellbeing". In the name of economic success, the European Union and its members close their eyes and allow to die thousands of people. To add insults to injury, these deaths are ignored by the media, as institutions do everything possible to make these catastrophes invisible.

The damage has three main axes: environmental, economic and social.

These industries are first of all environmental hazards. Do not follow the safety rules, releasing toxic products that pollute the air, the ground and the water. This pollution impacts not only nature but also, of course, human health. The working-class is the first impacted, but everyone within a range of a hundred kilometers is affected and risk to have health issues, notably cancer.

This environmental impact affects also the economic system of the area around these factories: the polluted area is unable to be properly cultivated, and the environmental situation makes the region touristically dead. The local economics become therefore intrinsically linked to the factory which caused this situation, creating a loop.

The last axis, the social axis, is defined by how this economic and environmental hazard creates a local social struggle, where lower, middle and upper classes continue dying for EU's and national economic development, and the enemy is the employer and the institutions who let it be because intervene would cost more than human lives.

A clarification is needed: talking about "sacrificed industrial cities" we are not talking about big polluted cities constantly attacked for their pollution,

but about normal cities with a higher cancer and pollution rate that are normally ignored and tend to not appear in statistics.

A concrete example - #IlvaIsAKiller

To make these dynamics tangible, the city of Taranto, often called "Italian Chernobyl", will be used as a model.

Taranto has been home for a steel mill since the 60s, Ilva, and during the last 40 years this city has been affected by this mill that has escaped EU environmental regulations duties, polluting all the area around for kilometres and creating health issues other than an economic and environmental catastrophe.

Taranto has been subject of many environmental and health studies, by academics, governmental institutions and international organisations (including [WHO](#)), and more than once it has been demonstrated how the steel production affects the lives of everybody in the area, creating an immeasurable damage. Nonetheless, still today its residents fight against the inaction of the Italian government and the European Union, as it has been said through words and sometimes through actions that Ilva brings too much to the Italian and European economy.

To this day, it has been proved that:

- Ilva causes at least 50 deaths per year, and influences more than 1000 indirect deaths per years;
- Ilva does not respect EU regulations on environmental security;
- Ilva is a danger for its workers, with many accidents through the years;
- Because of Ilva's pollution, Taranto's province has an abnormal higher rate of cancer and other health issues;
- The presence of Ilva highly influenced the touristical influx;
- The concentration of steel particles in the air is higher than allowed by the law, at the point that "curfews" are organised during some days for students and workers.

Conclusion

This dynamic is present with some variations in different parts of Europe, and as this dynamic is hidden from mass media, it's safe to say that these are not

isolated cases and that indeed it's more common than it appears.

With this resolution we request:

- -That the Federation of Young European Greens acknowledges the existence of these "invisible" industrial cities, standing in solidarity with the hundreds of victims affected by this situation every year and the thousands who died;
- -That the Federation of Young European Greens acknowledges these cities and their activists as one of the best examples of green activism, where climate justice and social justice interconnect perfectly;
- That the member organisations of FYEG make an effort to acknowledge industrial cities in their own countries that follow the aforementioned criterias, having as goal to make them visible and push institutional measures to change the social and environmental context of these cities;
- Where these industries are totally necessary to the existence of the local economy (and not for that for the national or European economy) because of the dependence created by the aforementioned reasons, an ecological reconversion must be privileged and pushed with immediate urgency.

R11 2% of GDP towards climate solutions

Proposer: Jong Groen
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

To keep global warming below 1.5°C, strong action by national governments is needed urgently. One way these governments can contribute to climate solutions is by investing structurally in a just transition. Scientists at Sapienship calculated that the 1.5°C target could be achieved with only 2% of global GDP invested in climate solutions. The Global North bears a historic responsibility in the climate crisis. As long as GDP is the main indicator for the financial situation of a country, European governments should incorporate 2% of their GDP towards a just transition in their (annual) budgeting.

Translating the 1.5°C goal agreed on in the international Paris Agreement into a national commitment of 2% of GDP towards climate solutions, makes the fight for 1.5°C more tangible. This clear and reasonable demand allows young green activists to effectively put pressure on the budgeting of their governments, and keeping them accountable in the execution of their financial plans.

The focus of these investments should be in line with the focus points and priorities stated in the FYEG Political Platform for a just transition towards climate neutrality. Technical fixes thus cannot be the center of these investments. National governments should think how they could invest public money towards climate solutions in the most cost-effective way, aligned with their national policy matters. Climate solutions oftentimes are interlinked and feed into each other. For thematic practical implementation, we again refer to our views in the FYEG Political Platform. Since more than 75% of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU stem from the energy sector and as example case, the investments of public money towards a just energy transition will be displayed in the following:

The most effective way to save energy is by not using it. Energy efficiency should be the number 1 priority for public spending by national governments. Investments should go towards the insulation of all homes and buildings by 2030. For a society that runs on 100% renewables, as it should by 2050, the energy grid needs to be electrified. Public money should thus flow towards the electrification of the energy grid and energy infrastructure.

Energy should be generated from renewable sources. Investments in wind and solar energy would be part of the 2% GDP towards climate solutions package. Although nuclear energy emits less carbon emissions, they cannot be included in this budget, as they have other environmental implications (like the extraction of uranium, security risks and the production of nuclear waste). Investment in fossil fuels does not belong within this budgeting package, as it's an energy source from the past and needs to be phased out of the energy mix completely as soon as possible. As the production of hydrogen is energy-intensive, it can only be considered a sustainable and green source of energy if produced in a 100% renewable way and used when no more energy efficient options are available. Investments in research & development on hydrogen are eligible, yet should not be the core objective of the 2% of GDP towards climate solutions. In this investment package, the focus stays on the funding of an urgent just transition, rather than the development of technical fixes. Also 'green hydrogen' imported from the Global South can not be considered an investment in a sustainable energy transition, as the transportation of hydrogen is an energy-intensive process in itself and threatens the energy security of communities in the exporting countries.

These investments will not only save us from climate catastrophe, but will also generate economic & societal gain. This resolution focuses on 'national governments', but 2% of of budgeting towards climate solutions should be the goal of every government & could also be a goal for budgets of non-state actors (organisations, universities, schools, ...) all from their own focus & competence. From the economic and financial gain that will emerge from these investments, European governments have more budgetary room to pay up for 'loss & damage', to countries in the Global South. 'Loss & damage' is not part of this financial plan, but should get its own program in government spending.

Reason

Some references: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiCvGQnweAg> & https://www.sapienship.co/decision-makers/2-percent-more?_gl=1*1bgswg0*_up*MQ

R12 The EU responsibility to support the Tunisian civil society

Proposer: écolo j, les jeunes ecologistes, PROTESTS,
Juventud Verde, Swiss Young Greens
(JVS/JGS)
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

1 In July 2021, the Tunisian president Kais Saied triggered Article 80 of the
2 Tunisian constitution¹, a coup de force that led to the dismantling of the
3 institutions resulting from the post-2011 transition of the Tunisian people's
4 uprising against the regime of the former dictator of Tunisia, Zine el-Abidine
5 Ben Ali, also known as the Jasmine Revolution.

6 The actions undertaken by the Saied regime, such as freezing and then dissolving
7 the Parliament, full powers by decree, ratification of a new constitution in
8 2022 with an extremely low participation rate and the legislative elections in
9 December/January 2023 with an even lower participation rate, racist outbursts
10 against Black Africans, persecution of political opponents and NGOs, draws up a
11 record that leaves no room for doubt about the undeniable authoritarian and
12 populist turn taken by the Saied regime in Tunisia.

13 Tunisia's new constitution, which entered into force in August 2022, removes
14 many checks and balances from the 2014 constitution and firmly centralises power
15 in the hands of the President, for example he now has the power to unilaterally
16 appoint the Prime Minister and can no longer be impeached for serious violations
17 of the constitution. As described by Amnesty International, "the adoption of the
18 new constitution comes after a year marked by a regression on human rights
19 protections in Tunisia"², leading to the weakening of human rights safeguards
20 and the rule of law. In addition to the constitutional changes, the judicial
21 system, until now independent from presidential power, is being further attacked
22 and dismantled in order to ensure that the presidential control is maintained.
23 In particular, with the support of the Ministry of Justice, which has been
24 completely under the control of the presidential power since its reform³, as
25 well as the use of the military justice system⁴, and the total impunity granted
26 to the security forces and the Ministry of the Interior. All this in a context
27 of dramatic socio-economic crisis and risk of default.

28 It is important to put in context the deterioration of the rule of law and

individual freedoms in Tunisia with the state of its economic situation. The fragility of the Tunisian economy has been strongly impacted and weakened by the two consecutive external shocks, the pandemic of COVID-19 and the outbreak of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Widespread shortages of food and their rationing, shortages of medicines but also of fuel have been commonplace in recent months.

The Tunisian state is struggling to pay for its imports and is in the midst of negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank to receive \$1.9 billion in financial support, while the political situation is moving towards a dictatorship that is repressing political opponents and minorities. The European Union, through the fascist Italy of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Tajani (former President of the European Parliament), is more concerned about the arrival of migrants in Europe via the Tunisian coast than anything else.

With Turkey, Morocco and Libya, Tunisia is one of the European Union partners supporting the externalisation of its borders in a "Fortress Europe" that is increasingly conciliatory with the anti-migration policies of the far-right. The number of victims and missing persons on the Tunisian coast from January to October 2022 is 544,241⁵. For many organisations, these shipwrecks are "consciously provoked" off the coast of Tunisia: While the European Union is steadily increasing its financial support to the Tunisian government in protecting and developing its coastline to avoid tragedies related to Mediterranean crossings, there is mounting evidence of the involvement of the Tunisian coast guard in dangerous manoeuvres that have cost the lives of many migrants. For the last decade, Italy has allocated 47 million euros to Tunisia to control their borders and migratory "flows", in parallel with a readmission agreement that allows Italy to expel Tunisian nationals at a rate of up to 4 charters per week. The EU has released 30 million euros from the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to implement an "integrated surveillance" system for maritime borders⁶.

It is important to denounce the reinforcement of hate speech by the Tunisian president himself towards Black African migrants/refugees and asylum seekers in the country which has intensified xenophobic and racist sentiment and acts of violence against these populations on the basis of conspiracy theories⁷. These words and acts of violence are also reused and integrated into the racist, xenophobic, anti-migrant and conspiracy theories of far-right movements and political parties in Europe... While far-right ideas are already at the heart of our institutions and gaining more and more power in our societies, this support from both sides of the Mediterranean is dangerous and threatens the safety of migrants and asylum seekers.

With this resolution FYEG:

- Condemns the violence, racism and systemic discrimination in Tunisia against the Black African populations present in the country.
- Supports the Tunisian civil society being targeted and controlled by a regime which is becoming more authoritarian, using the Ministries of Interior and of Justice (now fully subordinated to the President) as well as military institutions to shrink the democratic and human rights spaces in the country.
- Strongly denounces and is concerned about the resurgence of conspiracy and racist theories within European societies and the progression of fascist and far-right ideas and theories in the European Institutions.
- Calls on the European Union and its representatives to firmly and officially sanction the Tunisian president and his government for undermining the democratic values and processes established after the 2011 Revolution.
- Calls the European Union to immediately stop the externalisation of the EU border with Tunisia via the funding through European funds of the Saied regime to stop migration corridors.
- Reiterates the importance of the statements made in the resolution No Discrimination on Migration to develop an European humanitarian framework focusing on saving and welcoming refugees through safe corridors.

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R13 Information technologies and intellectual property policy within FYEG

Proposer: Swiss YG

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

FYEG opposes monopolies and oligopolies. Unfortunately, at the moment large sectors of the digital sphere are dominated by very few companies which are constantly trying to circumvent regulations, relentlessly aiming to increase their power and ignore user rights. Though there are save and secure free and open source alternatives available for almost every software tool and service the big tech companies offer at the moment. FYEG does not only support and act politically to dismantling tech giants and demonopolising digital offerings and the digital sphere, but also strives for the internal use of open source software and services, and the highest standards in digital security and privacy.

Open-Source commitment

As a principle FYEG:

- will adopt open source tools (as defined by the Free Software Foundation) for developing its work.
- will run free software on its own computers, especially those to be used in public.
- will use open formats for all public communications, publications and materials transmitted.
- will avoid the use of non-open-source, non-free contents in its website and all online tools.
- will ask for open formats to be used in documents officially addressed to FYEG.

The use of non-free software may be justified when no similar free software is available and when the objective cannot be reached by combining open source

25 tools.

26 **Security**

27 At least one FYEG official e-mail address will count with a GPG signature. All
28 official e-mail communications from FYEG shall be digitally signed. The public
29 key will be made available to the public.

30 **Privacy and individual rights**

31 In order to protect the privacy of individuals participating in any FYEG
32 activities:

- 33 • no pictures shall be posted on public sites or social networks without the
34 explicit consent of the individuals who can be identified in them.
- 35 • mailing lists archives and MO listings shall be kept accessible only by its
36 members.

37 The Executive Committee adopts a privacy policy that shall be accessible on its
38 website, in line with legal requirements and adapts said document timely in case
39 requirements and/or circumstances change and/or evolve.

Reason

this text is, except slight modifications, as point 8.3. Annex 3, part of the current IRPs. the ec suggest deleting it without replacement, whereas we believe it is important to keep a commitment to open source software and highest security and privacy standards in a written document within the organisation.

R14 Solidarity with Ukraine for as long as necessary

Proposer: ?????? ?????? ???????? (Green Youth of
Ukraine), Protests
Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

1 The horrific Russian war of aggression that began on March 9, 2014, turned full-
2 scale on 24 February 2022. The Russian army once again invaded Ukraine,
3 violating sovereignty, international law, and human rights, committing acts of
4 terrorism and genocide.

5 This is not only a war against Ukraine, it is an attack on all of us and our
6 common European values. Russia challenges not only the independence of Ukraine,
7 but also the system of security, peace, rule of law, and democracy in Europe.
8 Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has stepped up its
9 intimidation and threats against democratic states around the world, especially
10 neighbouring countries, as well as intensified its disinformation campaigns,
11 interference in the political processes of independent states, and imposing
12 approval of its aggressive policy, by weaponising food, energy, and migrants.
13 Moreover, Russia is constantly building up its military potential and forging
14 military cooperation with authoritarian states such as Iran, Belarus, China, and
15 North Korea.

16 We continue to condemn in the strongest terms Russia's war and the Belarusian
17 government's involvement in it, the human rights violations and war crimes
18 committed, acts of genocide and terrorism against Ukraine's population,
19 including targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure and houses, forced
20 deportations and massacres in the occupied territories.

21 Over the last year, there has been a growing amount of evidence of war crimes
22 and crimes against humanity committed by Russia during the war in Ukraine.

23 Russian troops, using terrorist methods, deliberately attacked residential areas
24 and civilian infrastructure. As a result, thousands of civilians were killed and
25 injured, and the country's energy infrastructure was severely damaged, leaving
26 tens of millions of Ukrainians without basic needs such as electricity, water,
27 and heat.

Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories has brought suffering and turmoil upon millions of people. Russia's policy of forcible Russification is aimed at erasing the Ukrainian identity of local residents. Thousands of civilians under Russian occupation have already been killed, and many others have been subjected to repression and torture, infiltration, kidnapping, persecution, sexual violence, or forced deportation. Russia practices illegal deportation of children to Russian territory and temporarily occupied Crimea, and forced adoption into Russian families, placement in boarding schools, and re-education camps.

The Russian invaders deliberately resort to sexual violence against women, men, and even children, which they use as a weapon of war, causing severe physical and psychological trauma to the victims.

The Young European Greens stand strongly with Ukraine in its fight for the freedom, democracy, territorial independence, and human rights of the Ukrainian people.

We highly appreciate the support and assistance to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people provided by the international community. However, as long as Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine continues, there is still a need for consolidation of international efforts to put pressure on Russia to end attacks on Ukrainian territory and withdraw the invading troops, as well as to support Ukraine in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

We call on the international community to:

- Accelerate the pace and volume of military aid to Ukraine to counter the Russian war of aggression. We believe that Ukraine has an inalienable right to self-defense against an aggressor, and successful Ukrainian military operations to de-occupy its own territories are steps towards establishing real peace in the country.
- Resolutely condemn any form of military aid to Russia and Russian war criminals, as well as contribute to the creation of conditions that will make it impossible to transport equipment or technologies that may have a military purpose from European countries to Russia and Belarus. Military aid to Russia only contributes to the continuation and escalation of the war, increasing the number of victims and suffering among the civilian population.
- Continue introducing sanctions against Russia and Belarus with the aim of

64 reducing their military, political, and economic potential for waging the
65 war, as well as increasing pressure on the citizens of the aggressor
66 countries to form a broad demand for an end to the war and the withdrawal
of the invading troops from the territory of Ukraine.

- 67 • Applying effective sanctions against countries that support Russia in its
68 aggression and invasion of Ukraine, especially by providing armed support,
69 as well as holding them accountable for complicity in the war.

- 70 • Impose sanctions on all third countries and companies that help Russia and
71 Belarus to circumvent embargoes and sanctions.

- 72 • Further strengthen the international isolation of the Russian Federation,
73 including depriving the state of membership in international organisations
74 such as the United Nations Security Council.

- 75 • Facilitate the creation of an international special tribunal to
76 investigate Russian war crimes in Ukraine and bring Russian and Belarusian
77 political and military leadership and other war criminals to justice.

- 78 • Increase support and aid for Ukraine, directly and through participation
79 in humanitarian funding appeals initiated by multilateral organisations.

- 80 • Provide support and protection to ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples
81 who have been affected by Russian imperialism and aggression, such as
82 Crimean Tatars.

- 83 • Continue supporting Ukrainian war refugees, assisting their integration
84 into the society of the host country, employment, and education.

- 85 • Avoid any steps that can be interpreted as equating the victim and the
86 aggressor.

87 We, the Young European Greens, firmly maintain that a sustainable and fair peace
88 in Ukraine can only be achieved on Ukraine's terms, and not dictated by the

89 aggressor state. We staunchly advocate for the uncompromising preservation of
90 Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and call for the immediate
91 withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, as well as the
92 restoration of Ukraine's borders as defined in the Budapest Memorandum.

93 We also stand against the violation of human rights and international law and
94 call for the prosecution of the aggressor country and all those supporting the
95 Russian war, acts of terrorism, and genocide in Ukraine.

R15 Decolonising Europe starts with us: Breaking the chains of colonialism within the Green movement

Proposer: FYEG

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Defining decoloniality

Decoloniality as a concept, an ideology, a movement, only exists due to the entrenchment of a hegemonic system of domination and oppression, a system of colonialism and imperialism (hereinafter often simply colonialism). Although 'formal' structures of state colonialism of the Global South has - debatably - ended in the period of decolonisation of the 20th century, colonial asymmetries and inequalities, and structures and systems of subjugation, oppression, and exploitation continue to be perpetuated, if not exacerbated, through the political, social, and economic hegemony of the Global North in the neoliberal global capitalist system. Thus, the Global North - the 'core' - is able to supply its pursuit of constant economic growth through the exploitation of resources and labour of the Global South - the 'periphery'.

Is it therefore essential to acknowledge that capitalism and colonialism are closely intertwined. The roots of capitalism lie in colonial history and capitalism continues to reproduce such colonial asymmetries. The Global North's sociopolitical and economic hegemony is only made possible through the continued oppression and exploitation of the Global South. Capitalism thus relies on a system of unequal exchange, as the Global North continues to benefit from these unequal power relations and perverse international division of labour and flow of resources, at the expense of the Global South - which also experiences the worst impacts of the consequent worsening climate crisis.[1]

These colonial asymmetries are not simply between states. Within states exists a sometimes loud but often invisible status quo of White superiority institutionally, systemically, and socially. **Colonialism**, therefore, as a social definition, is the occupation, exploitation or a guardianship of these structures by specific ideas, values and principles of a more dominant class. Colonisation can take different forms: social, cultural, financial, ethnic, educational, political, etc. It is thus important to take this into account when trying to tackle decoloniality, as through its interweaving in so many facets of

life, it can be manifest in very subtle ways. This makes coloniality so complex and difficult to see and recognise, and also what makes it such an essential struggle to wage.

Thus, in order to truly strive for social justice and equality, decoloniality must therefore be central in any effort for progress. **Decolonialism** is the process of freeing an institution, a sphere of activity, and so on, from the chains of colonialism, and its cultural or social effects.

In so doing, a complementary process of **interculturality** can be empowered, a process striving towards the building of a radically different society, of an “other” social ordering based on a plurinational state. A constant process of dialogue and interrelation, of bottom-up structural economic, social, political, and cultural transformations, for the full and permanent participation of racialised and ethnic-minoritised communities.[2]

What is decoloniality’s aim?

The aim would then be first to recognise those beliefs and concepts that shape these structures today without our being aware of them. The key notion would be to understand and identify such mechanisms, to be aware of their existence, and to analyse why they exist and continue to exist today.

The second step would be to implement actions to dismantle these mechanisms. Once we understand what binds institutions to perpetuate such notions of dominance, we must pursue the common objectives of breaking the chains of colonialism.

For example, production of knowledge has often been a tool of domination, oppression, and exploitation due to unequal power relations. Western knowledge, conveyed as ‘universal’ or ‘objective’ truths, imposed a monolithic worldview that gave power and control to the White European. Educational institutions today, from primary to tertiary education, continue to perpetuate this implicit Whiteness of knowledge through the materials and methods of teaching. Thus, decolonising schools and universities through incorporating knowledges of the Global South in content and teachings, platforming Global South scholars, and actively breaking the explicit or implicit chains of colonialism is a powerful and crucial decolonisation tool for the emancipation of racialised and culturally and ethnic-minoritised peoples.[3]

Why do we need decoloniality in ecology?

It is impossible to strive for a socially just ecology without decoloniality. Acknowledging the finiteness of our planetary boundaries, an ideology of

capitalist expansion eventually requires expansion to the periphery and the exploitation of resources and labour therein. This unequal exchange of not only resources, but externalities, as mentioned above, results in the Global South impacted the worst by the climate crisis. Even within Western states, indigenous peoples and communities of colour are amongst those that suffer the most from this crisis. [The climate crisis is inherently racist](#), and right at the forefront are racialised and ethnic-minoritised communities.

And yet, indigenous peoples and communities of colour continue to not only be [unheard or forgotten](#), [they are often erased from climate movement](#). We must acknowledge the reality that the [history of environmentalism is racist](#), and that striving for ecological sustainability without first prioritising decolonial justice perpetuates neocolonial asymmetries through imperialist environmentalism. Without the reversal of this unequal exchange and perverse flow of resources, we end up powering the Global North's transition through continued exploitation of the Global South.

Why do we need decoloniality in the Green movement?

In short, there is no climate justice without racial justice.

- We need a critical decolonial framework to broaden our 'core' (Eurocentric, Western, White) perspectives towards those of the 'periphery', and to broaden our understanding of environmentalism through knowledges and understandings from the Global South.
- We need to truly listen to those most impacted by our histories, by the neo-imperial system of capitalism today, and by the climate crisis - to platform and fight for their voices and interests to be heard in the Green movement.
- We need to accept that we may need to critically analyse and rethink much of what we thought to be true about the world and what it means to be inclusive, and reckon with the roles we have played in perpetuating exclusion, discrimination, or inequality, within FYEG, within the Green movement, and within broader society.

Why do we need decoloniality as we head into EU24?

#BrusselsSoWhite.

- As we head into these elections, we need substantive representation - the incorporation of racial justice and the interests of racialised and ethnic-minoritised peoples within party manifestos, campaigns, and the agenda of European politics.
- At the same time, we need descriptive representation. 4% of Members of the European Parliament are White, and much of the rest of its apparatus. Studies show politicians of minoritised identities are more likely to advocate for the rights of minorities. In any case, people of colour deserve to see themselves reflected in the political structures that represent them.

Therefore, the Racial Justice Task Force demands that FYEG and its Member Organisations:

Politically:

- **Increasingly include, platform, listen to, and work more closely with racial justice organisations and activists** in Europe and from the Global South. We should actively strive to collaborate with and highlight the work of indigenous activists and young greens of colour at the forefront of this movement, especially those in the Global South;
- **Incorporate and emphasise racial justice, inclusion, representation, and a broader decolonial framework of thinking** in setting up their campaigns for EU24;
- **Actively encourage bold, young greens of colour** to run for the European Parliament via their respective mother parties, and to provide sufficient support and mentorship to do so and to be placed in electable positions;

Organisationally:

- **Take steps to assess the practices, policies, and cultures of their internal organisation** and on how this excludes or fosters an atmosphere of exclusion for people of colour;

- **Work more actively to make their organisations more inclusive**, for example by working on meaningful diversity and inclusion plans that address the lack of young greens of colour in their respective organisations.

We demand that FYEG:

- **Ensures diverse representation of young greens of colour in the Young Candidates Platform**, to the extent possible.
- **Especially considers the disparities and barriers to accessibility** faced by young greens of colour in politics, and, where necessary and possible, to ensure the Young Candidates Platform considers these intersectionalities in the support and trainings it provides young candidates of colour.

We urge that:

- **This be the first of one of many future steps** to expand FYEG's work on decoloniality, interculturality, racial justice, representation, and inclusion as we work towards making FYEG a Federation that is truly antiracist, racially just, and inclusive.
- **Future steps actively expand on decoloniality, interculturality and racial justice** in specific areas of policy, where possible.
- **All components of FYEG** aim to place decoloniality, interculturality, and racial justice at the very heart of our collective movement.

Last words

Decoloniality and interculturality is more than social justice. It is a constant process in envisioning a different world - anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-segregationist, with a different social ordering and relationship between peoples.

We do not want this resolution to use decolonisation as a metaphor, but a

starting point for radical change. "[Decolonisation is not an 'and'. It is an elsewhere.](#)"[4] As a progressive organisation, it is about time we work to create this 'elsewhere.'

References

[1] Silva, G. T. (2022). An overview of strategies for social-ecological transformation in the field of trade and decolonialisation. In Barlow, N., Regen, L., Cadiou, N., Chertkovskaya, E., Hollweg, M., Plank, C., Schulken, M., & Wolf, V. (Eds.), *Degrowth & Strategy: How to Bring about Social-Ecological Transformation* (pp. 375-382). Mayfly Books.

[2] Mignolo, W. D. & Walsh, C. E. (2018). Interculturality and Decoloniality. In *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis* (pp. 57-80). Duke University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1lg9616.7>.

[3] Akena, F. A. (2012). Critical Analysis of the Production of Western Knowledge and Its Implications for Indigenous Knowledge and Decolonization. *Journal of Black Studies*, 43(6), 599-619. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934712440448>.

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Reason

This resolution was drafted by the Racial Justice Task Force. It aims to be a starting point for FYEG and for any mainstream political organisation to tackle decoloniality, and to set the foundation for future work on decoloniality within FYEG. Decoloniality is an important, essential, and necessary framework of antiracism, and part of FYEG's efforts to make FYEG truly a Federation of antiracism and racial justice, one in solidarity with and inclusive for racialised and ethnic-minoritised communities.

SR1 Delaying the General Assembly for the EU24 Elections

Proposer: FYEG

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Noting that

- According to the 2022 Statutes and Internal Rules of Procedure (IRPs) the General Assembly (GA) is held once a year. In practice, this is typically from the month of May to the month of May the following year;
- The 2022 Statutes and IRPs define the mandate of the Executive Committee (EC) as one year;
- The 2022 IRPs similarly sets out the periods of mandates of other organs, based on elections at the GA.

Considering that

- The upcoming EU 2024 elections will likely fall during the usual period in which the GA is organised. Therefore, the GA will need to be organised after the elections to prioritise FYEG's EU24 campaign – in August or September 2024;
- This would result in the mandates of all the relevant organs elected at the 2023 General Assembly lasting at least three to four months longer than the usual mandate;
- This would result in the mandates of all the relevant organs elected at the 2024 General Assembly lasting at least three to four months shorter than the usual mandate.

The Executive Committee requests, with the approval of the General Assembly, that

- The next GA take place after the EU 2024 elections, in August or September, with all relevant deadlines adjusted accordingly;
- And consequently to define a year as the period between GAs – striving as far as possible to keep this in line with one calendar year (12 months).
- Note: As the Statutes and IRP are being amended, assuming all changes regarding mandates are adopted, this resolution will be, where necessary, interpreted accordingly to account for these changes.

Reason

The text is discussing the timing of the General Assembly (GA) and the mandates of various organizations within it. According to the rules, the GA is held once a year, typically from May to May, and the Executive Committee's mandate lasts for one year. However, the upcoming EU 2024 elections will likely happen during the usual GA period, so the GA will need to be organized after the elections. This means that the mandates of all relevant organs elected at the GA will last at least three to four months longer than the usual mandate. To address this, the Executive Committee proposes that the next GA take place after the EU 2024 elections in August or September, and that the mandates of all relevant organs are adjusted accordingly. They suggest defining a year as the period between GAs and striving to keep this in line with one calendar year. The text also notes that changes to the rules may affect this resolution.

SR2 Decreasing the number of members of the FCAC

Proposer: FYEG

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Noting that

- The 2022 IRPs state that the Financial Control and Advisory Committee (FCAC) is composed of four members.
- If adopted, the proposed 2023 IRP will amend and decrease the number of members of the FCAC to two.

Considering that

- Three members of the FCAC are outgoing, meaning these seats are up for election in the 2023 General Assembly,
- There is an alternating mandate principle of the FCAC, (so one new, one experienced member in order to ensure knowledge transfer),
- If the three seats are filled in at this General Assembly, the next opportunity to execute a two-person FCAC would be in 2025 General Assembly,

The Executive Committee requests, with the approval of the General Assembly, that

- For the election of the new FCAC, the proposed 2023 IRP changes regarding the number of members is applied retroactively, meaning if the amendment to the IRPs passes only one person is elected to the FCAC.

- 19 • Note: As the Statutes and IRP are being amended, this resolution may only
20 have working if all relevant changes regarding mandates in the proposed
21 2023 Statutes and IRP are adopted.

SR3 Recognising Current and Next EC Mandate as Single Term

Proposer: FYEG

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Noting that

- The 2022 Statutes define the mandate of the Executive Committee (EC) as one year (Art. 9.2.), elected at the General Assembly (GA). The 2022 Internal Rules of Procedure (IRP) similarly specifies this yearly mandate (Art. 2.2.1 in conjunction with 2.1.4);
- If adopted, the proposed 2023 IRP will amend and increase the mandate of the EC to two years, which can be renewed two times (Proposed Art. 4.2.).

Considering that

- The upcoming mandate of the EC is one year* as changes to the Statutes and IRP regarding mandates only come into force for the subsequent GA onwards;
- The current 2022-2023 EC members opting to renew their mandates would technically then have served two terms, although according to the proposed 2023 IRP, this is cumulatively a period of two years* which would otherwise be a single term. This would mean current EC members may serve a total of four years and are prevented from enjoying their full maximum of three mandates of two years (= six years).
- * (See the Resolution on Delaying the General Assembly for the EU24 Elections)

The Executive Committee requests, with the approval of the General Assembly, that

- For the current 2022-2023 EC members renewing their mandates at GA23, the proposed 2023 IRP changes regarding mandates, if adopted, will function retroactively. Those having served two one-year mandates from 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 will, for the purpose for the 2023 IRP, be interpreted as having served a single two-year mandate.
- Note: As the Statutes and IRP are being amended, this resolution may only have working if all relevant changes regarding mandates in the proposed 2023 Statutes and IRP are adopted.

SR4 Retroactive Three-Year Mandate for the Secretary-General

Proposer: FYEG

Agenda item: 1. Resolutions

Motion text

Noting that

- The 2022 Internal Rules of Procedure (IRP) define the mandate of the Secretary-General (SG) as two years (Art. 2.3.), elected at the General Assembly (GA);
- If adopted, the proposed 2023 IRP will amend and increase the mandate of the SG to three years, which can be renewed once (Proposed Art. 4.3.).

Considering that

- The upcoming mandate of the SG is two years* as changes to the Statutes and IRP regarding mandates only come into force for the subsequent GA onwards;
- For the sake of continuity and long-term planning of FYEG (assuming the adoption of the proposed 2023 IRP), as well as the volatile upcoming period with the transfer of responsibilities to the newly-elected SG, the EU24 elections, and the renewal of the Strategy Plan in 2025, recognising the coming mandate as three years will allow a smooth transfer of powers and enable the SG to make full use of their role as SG in this period.
- As such, the call was published with this in mind, as a period of three years.
- * (See the Resolution on Delaying the General Assembly for the EU24 Elections)

21 **The Executive Committee requests, with the approval of the General Assembly,**
22 **that**

- 23 • For the SG elected at GA23, the proposed 2023 IRP changes regarding their
24 mandate, if adopted, will function retroactively. The SG elected at GA23
25 will, for the purpose for the 2023 IRP, be interpreted as being elected to
26 serve a three-year mandate.

27 Note: As the Statutes and IRP are being amended, this resolution may only have
28 working if all relevant changes regarding the mandate of the SG in the proposed
29 2023 Statutes and IRP are adopted.