R8: EU has to take their responsabilities about DRC's conflict !

The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) cannot be reduced
to isolated events or simplified narratives. Rather, it is the product of deeply
rooted structural factors, including colonial legacies, regional power
struggles, and the global demand for natural resources. Our aim is to provide a
concise yet essential historical and contextual background. This overview
underscores the continuity between past and present forms. It also situates the
role of the EU, within a broader framework of responsibility, accountability,
and policy coherence.

History

Belgium

Late 1860s, King Leopold II, king of Belgium, developed an early obsession with
colonies as a prerequisite for making Belgium a “great power.” He presented his
plans in international forums as humanitarian and scientific missions to combat
slavery and bring “civilization” and Christianity, but historians agree that
profit-seeking was the primary driving force.

Leopold granted large tracts of territory as concessions to private companies
such as the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company and the Société Anversoise, which
in return surrendered a portion of their profits. These companies were allowed
to levy taxes in kind, organize forced labor, and deploy their own armed forces
to enforce rubber quotas. As a result, large parts of the country were
transformed into giant rubber plantations, where the population had to harvest
rubber only to subsequently hand it over far below the world market price. The
labor regime was characterized by extreme coercion, violence, and terror,
especially in the rubber zones.

Historical and demographic estimates vary, but many studies speak about millions
of deaths as a result of murders, hunger, overwork, disease, and declining birth
rates during Leopold's reign.

Under heavy international pressure and growing Belgian political resistance, the
Belgian state took the Congo Free State in 1908 over and transformed it into the
Belgian Congo. At this time, the economic core shifted from rubber and ivory to
mining: copper, cobalt, uranium, gold, and diamonds from regions such as Katanga
and Kasaï became the focus. The Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), was
founded in 1906 as a joint venture with the Société Générale de Belgique and
British partners, it became one of the most profitable mining companies in the
world and controlled an estimated 70% of the Congolese economy. Companies such
as UMHK and Belgian Congo Oil Mills developed their own paternalistic “state” :
they built mining towns, hospitals, schools, and infrastructure, but under
strict racial segregation and labor discipline. Profits flowed primarily to
Belgian shareholders and holdings, while Congolese workers received low wages
and remained subject to colonial control. A large part of the profits was used
to urban projects in Belgium to finance, primarily in Brussels and the
surrounding area. The Empain Group, Brufina (now ING Belgium), and de Cominière,
all Belgian companies, controlled infrastructure, energy, and transport.

In Antwerp, during the 1885 and 1894 world exhibitions, “Congolese villages”
displayed over a hundred Congolese people in degrading conditions. Used as
propaganda by Leopold II, these exhibitions aimed to legitimize colonialism by
reinforcing racist hierarchies and showing the so-called “civilizing work”,
similar to the “human zoos” seen across Europe.

The independence of Congo on June 30, 1960, was barely prepared and created a
power vacuum that ultimately led to the Congo Crisis and the assassination of
Patrice Lumumba with involvement of the Belgian state and the CIA. Following
Lumumba’s assassination and the gradual suppression of alternative governments,
Mobutu finally came to power in 1965. He installed a long-lasting dictatorship
(Zaire) that relied on patronage, repression, and close ties with Western states
and companies in exchange for access to raw materials.

Rwanda

Colonial intervention profoundly disrupted the order in Rwanda. The borders,
drawn without taking into account local realities, froze spaces that were
previously interconnected, and thus became subject to new tensions. Influenced
by anthropometry, a pseudoscience aimed at classifying and hierarchizing
“races,” the colonial administration imposed a racialized reading of society.
The Tutsis were then defined as coming from a people of herders of so-called
“Hamitic” origin, supposedly superior to the Hutus and the Twas. This
racialization of Rwandan society has major consequences o the genocide of the
Tutsis in 1994 and up to today.

At the end of the 1950s, in a context of rising independence demands and under
pressure from the United Nations, Belgium profoundly modified its policy in
Rwanda. Whereas it had until then relied on Tutsi elites, it now chose to
support the Hutu majority, considered more numerous and more docile. After
independence, in 1962, Belgium continued to support Rwandan authorities
dominated by the Hutus until the genocide, which lasted from April to July 1994
made at least 800,000 victims.

The Rwandan Genocide helps explain the current situation in the Kivu region,
which, situated between Rwanda and the rest of the RDC, experienced a profound
shift in its dynamics.

Current situation

On the ground

After the Rwandan genocide, rebel group composed mostly of ethnic Tutsis emerged
called M23. It first launched a rebellion in 2012, briefly capturing Goma before
being pushed back. The group has been inactive for years, but resurged in 2022
with renewed support from Rwanda. Rwanda's involvement is the most contentious
element of the current conflict. Rwanda was accused of providing troops,
weapons, and direct military support to M23, accusations that Rwanda denies.
Rwanda's stated concern is the presence of the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu military force with ties to the 1994
genocide, which operates in eastern DRC and has at times cooperated with the
Congolese army.

In January 2025, M23 launched a major offensive and captured Goma. Rwandan
troops reportedly fought alongside the rebels, a development that prompted the
DRC to officially sever diplomatic ties with Rwanda. The human toll of this
specific offensive was devastating. Estimates suggest that between 900 and 2,000
people were killed in the fighting, while hundreds of thousands of civilians
were forced to flee. Although M23 declared a ceasefire in early February 2025,
the occupation left the region in a state of high-stakes instability that
persists into 2026. Rwanda and Uganda have intervened repeatedly, sometimes with
genuine security concerns, with economic motives, turning the eastern DRC into a
place for proxy warfare, where countries indirectly confront each other through
military and economic support of different actors. Currently, 8.2 million people
are displaced, projected to reach 9 million by end-2026, including 5.8 million
internally displaced. Nearly 15 million people are in need of humanitarian
assistance. Disease outbreaks, food insecurity, and sexual violence (use as a
weapon of war) are extremely present.

EU relationships

The European Union’s raw materials partnerships

The European Union’s raw materials diplomacy is a central pillar of its
industrial strategy, aimed at securing access to mineral reserves that are
essential for European industry. To achieve this, the EU establishes strategic
partnerships and policy dialogues. At the same time, the EU implemented the
Conflict Minerals Regulation requiring EU companies to ensure their imports come
from responsible sources only. However, these partnerships have encountered
significant ethical and geopolitical problems, most notably regarding the EU-
Rwanda strategic partnership, intended to develop "sustainable value chains",
signed in February 2024. Reports from the United Nations and other international
organizations suggest that minerals exported from Rwanda are often illicitly
smuggled from the DRC, which is inextricably linked to violent activities.

Budgetary and military support to Rwanda

The EU provides military and budgetary assistance to Rwanda primarily through
the European Peace Facility. The EU justifies this support as a commitment to
"African solutions for African problems" and as a means to protect regional
interests. However, this military support is highly controversial due to the
lack of traceability of funds.

Demands :

We, as FYEG, call upon the EU, its member states, and the international
community to:

Bibliography (need to be completed)

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